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ARGUMENT
I.

THE FINDINGS IN THE PARIA PROCEEDING RELATING TO THE
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AND THE ALTER EGO ISSUES ARE NOT
BINDING UPON PGM BECAUSE PGM WAS NOT NAMED, WAS NOT
SERVED, AND DID NOT APPEAR IN THE PARIA PROCEEDING.
A.

The Finding of Fraudulent Transfer in the Paria Proceeding Is Not
Binding on PGM as a Transferee because PGM Was Not a Party to the
Paria Proceeding and because the Remedies Available to a Creditor for
Relief against a Fraudulent Transfer Are Subject to the Procedures
Prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Westchester argues that the trial court's dismissal of PGM's Complaint was proper
based upon the finding in the Paria proceeding that Paria transferred its property to PGM
with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Mr. Zimmerman's and Paria Group's
creditors." Record at 0017. After this finding, the Paria court imposed a constructive
trust upon PGM's assets "to the extent necessary to satisfy Westchester's judgment" in
the amount of $244,976.82. Record at 0016-0015. Westchester contends that the
judgment entered against PGM in the Paria proceeding may be affirmed because Utah
Code Annotated § 25-6-8 provides that a creditor may obtain an avoidance of a fraudulent
transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim.
This argument does not provide an independent basis for dismissal as urged by
Westchester. Westchester ignores the fact that PGM was not named, was not served, and
did not otherwise appear in the Paria proceeding. As the United States Supreme Court
explained, "It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam from

1

litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a
party by service of process." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc.. 395 U.S.
100, 110, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (1969). As the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, not actual knowledge of the
commencement of the action, which confers jurisdiction.... The proper issuance
and service of summons is the means of invoking the jurisdiction of the court and
of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant; these cannot be supplanted by mere
notice, by letter, telephone or any other such means.

•

(

Murdock v. Blake. 484 P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1971): see also Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d
288 (Utah 1986) (holding that the requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 relating
i

to service of process are jurisdictional). Because PGM was not named, nor served, in the
Paria proceeding, PGM is not bound by the findings and judgment entered in the Paria
proceeding.
1.

The remedies available to a creditor for relief against a
fraudulent transfer are subject to Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9
and the procedures prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

(

Westchester fails to recognize that the remedies available to a creditor under Utah
Code Annotated § 25-6-8 are subject to the limitations of Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9

<

and the procedures prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 25-6-8,
Remedies of creditors, provides:
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a
creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy
<

2

the creditor's claim;
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset
transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with
applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred
or of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(Bold added.)
2.

Because PGM was not a party to the Paria proceeding, the
finding of fraudulent transfer and the imposition of a
constructive trust should be vacated.

Because PGM was not named and was not served in the Paria proceeding pursuant
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the judgment and findings entered in the Paria
proceeding are not binding upon PGM. Moreover, the finding that the transfer was
fraudulent and the order voiding the transfer of assets from Paria to PGM and imposing a
constructive trust on PGM's assets should be vacated and set aside because PGM, as
transferee of the assets, was an indispensable party. Though Utah has not addressed this
issue specifically, numerous Utah cases which allow a creditor to reach the assets
fraudulently transferred include the transferee as a named and served defendant. Butler v.
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987); Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird.
781 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1989); National Loan Investors. L.P. v. Givens. 952 P.2d 1067
(Utah 1998).
3

Requiring that the transferee of a fraudulent conveyance be a named party of an
action to set aside the conveyance and execute on the transferred asset is consistent with
decisions from other jurisdictions. In Tanaka v. Nagata. 868 P.2d 450,454 (Hawaii
1994), the Supreme Court of Hawaii vacated and set aside the trial court's order granting
the creditor's motion to execute on a fraudulently transferred asset on the grounds that the
transferees should have been named as party defendants in underlying action. The court
held:
where a creditor alleges a fraudulent transfer of property from a judgment debtor
to a transferee who retains title to the subject property or who claims an interest in
the property or its proceeds, the transferee is a necessary party to any action
seeking to set aside the transfer, [footnote omitted] Such an action for relief
against a transfer alleged to be fraudulent should be brought pursuant to Hawai'i
Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 651C (1985) [citation omitted], and should expressly
name the alleged fraudulent transferees as defendants.1
Tanaka. 868 P.2d at 454 (bold added). The court further explained:
Fundamental principles of due process require that transferees who claim an
interest in real property or its proceeds have a full and fair opportunity to contest
claims of fraudulent transfer.
Id. at 455. In reaching this holding, the Hawaii Supreme Court relied on the decisions of
the following jurisdictions: Simmons v. Clark Equipment Credit Corp.. 554 So.2d 398,
399 (Ala. 1989) (grantee who retained title to property was necessary party to action by
grantor's creditors to set aside conveyance as fraudulent); T W M Homes. Inc. v.
Atherwood Realty & Investment Co.. 214 Cal.App.2d 826, 848, 29 Cal.Rptr. 887, 899
"HRS ch. 651C (1985) is substantially similar to Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-8.
4

(1963) (transferees were necessary party defendants in action to set aside fraudulent
conveyance); Guice v. Modica. 337 So.2d 302, 303 (La. App. 1976) (children to whom
debtor made donation of property were indispensable parties to suit by creditor to nullify
donation); Mihajlovski v. Elfakir. 355 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Mich. App. 1984) (presence of
grantee who retains title to property was essential to permit court to render complete relief
in action to set aside fraudulent conveyance); Murray v. Murray. 358 So.2d 723, 725
(Miss. 1978) (grantee is necessary party in action to set aside fraudulent conveyance);
Dempsev & Spring. P.C. v. Ramsav. 435 N.Y.S.2d 336, 337 (1981) (trial court acted
improperly in determining that defendant's conveyance of property to his daughter was
fraudulent where no notice or opportunity to appear was afforded to daughter, who was
present owner of record); Fraley Ins. Agency v. Johnston. 784 P.2d 430, 431 (Okla. App.
1989) (in action to set aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer of property, grantee or
transferee claiming interest in subject property was necessary and indispensable to
resolution of claim); Becker v. Becker. 416 A.2d 156, 162 (Vt. 1980) (transfer of property
creates an interest in grantee that made grantee necessary party to action for fraudulent
conveyance, even though no fraud on grantee's part needed to be shown); see also.
Kennedy, Reception of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 43 S.C.L.Rev. 655, 673
(1992) (to avoid constitutional due process objections, any transferee or other claimant to
property transferred or its proceeds should be party to any creditor's action that would
affect claimant's rights in property).
5

Further, a fraudulent transfer is not voidable against a person who took in good
faith and for reasonably equivalent value. Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9(a). There are
no findings in the record of the Paria proceeding provided to the PGM proceeding which
establish that PGM was not a good faith purchaser for value. This is a result of the fact
that PGM never made an appearance in the Paria proceeding. To enforce the judgment
entered in the Paria proceeding against PGM when PGM was never afforded an
opportunity to be heard by appearing and defending would violate PGM's right to due
process.
Because PGM, as transferee, was not made a party to the Paria proceeding, the

'

finding and constructive trust entered therein are void and should be vacated.
Consequently, the judgment in the Paria proceeding "is not res adjudicata of anything."
In re Evans. 130 P. 217, 225 (Utah 1913); Matsushima v. Rego. 696 P.2d 843, 845
(Hawai'i 1985) (the doctrine of res judicata is predicated upon a valid judgment and a
I

void judgment may not be used to invoke its application); Estate of Blaney. 607 P.2d 354,
357 (Wyo. 1980) (a void judgment is not res judicata).
B.

The Judgment and the Findings in the Paria Proceeding Are Not
Binding on PGM because PGM Was Not Subject to the Jurisdiction of
the Paria Court.

<

Westchester's arguments for enforcing both the fraudulent transfer findings and
the judgment against PGM are based on the allegation that PGM is the alter ego of Paria
and Stephen Zimmerman. Essentially Westchester's argument presupposes the answer to
i

6

the issue which PGM seeks to litigate: Whether PGM is the alter ego of Stephen
Zimmerman and/or Paria.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a stipulation that one
corporation is the alter ego of another corporation is not "an adequate substitute for the
normal methods of obtaining jurisdiction over a person or a corporation." Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 395 U.S. 1005 110, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (1969).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court also indicated that a determination that one
corporation is the alter ego of another corporation would not be binding on the
corporation which was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court so finding, even if the
issue of alter ego had been actually litigated. As the Court explained:
Perhaps Zenith could have proved and the trial court might have found that HRI
and Hazeltine were alter egos; but absent jurisdiction over Hazeltine, that
determination would bind only HRI. If the alter ego issue had been litigated,
and if the trial court had decided that HRI and Hazeltine were one and the same
entity and that jurisdiction over HRI gave the court jurisdiction over Hazeltine,
perhaps Hazeltine's appearance before judgment with full opportunity to
contest jurisdiction would warrant entry of judgment against it.[2] But that is
not what occurred here. The trial court's judgment was based wholly on HRTs
stipulation. HRI may have executed the stipulation to avoid litigating the alter ego
issue, [footnote omitted] but this fact cannot foreclose Hazeltine, which has never
had its day in court on the question of whether it and its subsidiary should be
considered the same entity for purposes of this litigation.
Zenith. 395 U.S. at 111, 89 S. Ct. at 1570 (bold added).
In the present case it is undisputed that PGM was not named, was not served, and
2

Hazeltine, unlike PGM, filed a "special appearance" after Zenith proposed that
judgment be entered against it. Zenith, 395 U.S. at 109, 89 S. Ct. at 1569.
7

did not appear in the Paria proceeding. It is also undisputed that PGM never made a
special appearance "with full opportunity to contest jurisdiction." As a result, there was
no jurisdiction over PGM in the Paria proceeding, and the judgment and findings entered
therein relating to the alter ego issue and the fraudulent transfer are not binding on PGM.
Essentially, because PGM was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Paria court, the
findings and judgment therein as to PGM are void. Thus, the findings and judgment in
the Paria proceeding are not res judicata. In re Evans. 130 P. at 225.
1.

Even if the alter ego issue were fully litigated in the Paria
proceeding, a determination that PGM is the alter ego of Paria
and/or Stephen Zimmerman is not binding on PGM who never
appeared to contest jurisdiction.

Westchester attempts to distinguish the holding in Zenith by arguing that the issue
of alter ego was fully litigated in the Paria proceeding. Even if such issue had been
actually litigated, it is doubtful that it was fully and fairly litigated because PGM never
appeared in the Paria proceeding. Westchester contends that the court in the Paria
proceeding based its finding that Stephen Zimmerman was the alter ego of Paria and
PGM on numerous "other circumstances" which justified the court's judgment against
PGM. Appellee's Brief, p. 29. Westchester argues that "PGM/Paria/Zimmerman had an
opportunity to folly and completely litigate the issue of whether PGM, Paria, and
Zimmerman were alter egos." Id.
This argument ignores the fact that PGM was never subject to the Paria court's

8

jurisdiction because PGM was not named, was not served, and did not appear in the Paria
proceeding. Basically, Westchester's argument is that PGM had the opportunity to
litigate the issue because it is the alter ego of Steven Zimmerman and Paria. Such
reasoning is circular and contrary to the sound reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court. Despite Westchester's attempts to distinguish it, the holding in Zenith is precisely
on point. The United States Supreme Court held that the stipulation and Hazeltine's
special appearance to contest jurisdiction "with full opportunity to contest jurisdiction"
were not adequate substitutes for the "normal methods of obtaining jurisdiction over a
person or corporation." Zenith. 395 U.S. at 109-110, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 1569. Thus, even
though the alter ego issue may arguably have been fully litigated in the Paria proceeding,
PGM never had a full opportunity to contest jurisdiction in the Paria case. This is
because PGM was not named, was not served, and never entered an appearance-the
normal methods of obtaining jurisdiction over a corporation—in the Paria proceeding.
Therefore, it is clear that the findings and judgment entered against PGM in the Paria
proceeding are void and not binding on PGM. Consequently, those findings and
judgment are not res judicata to PGM. In re Evans. 130 P. at 225.
2.

There is no privity between PGM and Stephen Zimmerman and
Paria such that res judicata would apply.

Westchester argues that PGM is bound by the findings and judgment in the Paria
proceeding because Stephen Zimmerman represented both Paria and PGM in the Paria

9

proceeding, despite the fact that there is no finding and no evidence that Stephen
Zimmerman appeared in the Paria proceeding on behalf of PGM. Westchester bases its
argument on the fact that Stephen Zimmerman is a director of both corporations.3
Westchester states "Stephen Zimmerman is the president and CEO of Paria Group and of
i

PGM." Appellee's Brief, page 16. This statement is patently false. As the addendum to
Westchester's brief clearly indicates, the president of PGM is Jenifer Gordon-not
Stephen Zimmerman. Appellee's Brief, page A-2.
Westchester sets forth the general rule that a corporation controlled by the same
person who controlled the corporation involved in the first litigation is bound by the

<

judgment. Appellee's Brief, page 19. Though PGM does not dispute the accuracy of this
general rule, it does dispute the rule's relevancy to this action. The cases cited by
Westchester to support the above-mentioned rule are factually distinguishable. In several
of the cases, the plaintiff, after bringing an action personally, attempted to bring the same
action as shareholder of a closely-held corporation. The courts found that the closelyheld corporation and the owners should not be regarded as distinct. Thus, a judgment
against the shareholder personally would be conclusive on the corporation, and vice-

(

versa.
The cases cited by Westchester, wherein privity was found to exist between the

3

Westchester also bases its argument on Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 59,
comment e. However, this Restatement section has not been adopted in Utah.
10

<

officers or shareholders and the corporation, are distinguishable from the present case
because Stephen Zimmerman is not a shareholder, officer, or owner of PGM. Carla
Zimmerman is the sole shareholder of PGM. Westchester assumes that because the Paria
court found Paria and Stephen Zimmerman to be alter egos, somehow Stephen
Zimmerman's appearance in the Paria proceeding on behalf of Paria is binding on PGM.
Though Paria and Stephen Zimmerman may be considered one and the same for litigation
purposes because Stephen Zimmerman is a shareholder of Paria, this privity does not
automatically extend to PGM simply because Zimmerman is also a director of PGM.
This is because Westchester's argument ignores the general rule that:
The corporate entity is distinct although all or a majority of its stock is owned by a
single individual or corporation, or although the corporation is a so-called "family"
or "close" corporation...
18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 45. Stephen Zimmerman appeared in the Paria proceeding
individually and on behalf of Paria. Because Stephen Zimmerman is not an officer or
shareholder of PGM and because there are no evidence and no findings that Stephen
Zimmerman was appearing on behalf of PGM in the Paria proceeding, it cannot be said
that PGM is bound by Stephen's appearance in the Paria proceeding. PGM was not a
named party in the first litigation, and therefore PGM should not be precluded from
having its day in court.
Westchester also contends that PGM is in privity with Paria because PGM is
Paria's successor in interest. Appellee's Brief, page 21. While PGM did purchase assets
11

from Paria, these assets were not the subject matter of the litigation and PGM did not
obtain the same interests as Paria in these assets. A "successor in interest" is defined as:
One who follows another in ownership or control of property. In order to be a
"successor in interest", a party must continue to retain the same rights as original
owner without change in ownership and there must be change in form only and not
in substance, and transferee is not a "successor in interest."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,

abridged 6th edition, (1991), page 998 (bold added).

Because PGM is the transferee of Paria's assets and because Paria did not transfer any of
its liabilities to PGM, PGM is not Paria's successor in interest.
In arguing the PGM is Paria's successor in interest, Westchester relies on the
following rule on successor liability:
The rule for a claim based on successor liability is that where one company
sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to another company the latter is not liable
for the debts and liabilities of the transferor, except where:... (3) the purchasing
corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the
transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts.
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways. Inc.. 374 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. July 21,
1999). Contrary to Westchester's contention, the Paria court did not find that PGM was
"merely a continuation" of Paria. And although the Paria court specifically found that the
transaction between Paria and PGM was fraudulent and was entered into in order for
Paria to escape liability for its debts, PGM is not bound by this finding because, as
explained above, PGM was not a party to the Paria proceeding and PGM never had the
opportunity to litigate this issue in court.
<

12

3.

Because of the circularity involved in determining the issue of
privity when that is the procedural and substantive issue
presented, the application of res judicata is inappropriate.

It is clear that whether PGM is in privity with Paria and/or Stephen Zimmerman as
their alter ego determines whether res judicata applies. It is also clear that the issue of
privity and alter ego is the substantive issue PGM seeks to litigate. Because of the
circularity involved in such a situation, the Eighth Circuit has held that res judicata is not
appropriate when the procedural issue and substantive issue are the same issues of privity
and alter ego. Crest Tankers v. National Maritime Union of America. 769 F.2d 234 (8th
Cir. 1986).
Westchester argues that Crest Tankers does not apply because it centered on a
labor dispute involving large co-subsidiaries and their parent corporation; therefore,
whether the corporations are alter egos would be much more difficult to determine.
However, Westchester gives no reason why it would be a more difficult determination
and offers no conclusion as to why this alleged greater degree of difficulty has any
relevance to the present action. The alter-ego issue in this case would appear to be just as
difficult an issue, and any relative difference in degree of difficulty is not a valid basis for
Westchester's attempt to distinguish Crest Tankers.
In Crest Tankers, the procedural issue of privity between two co-subsidiary
corporations and their parent corporation was too circular to apply res judicata when the
identity of the corporations was the substantive issue sought to be litigated. In the present
13

case, PGM contends that it is not in privity and is not the alter ego of Paria, a separate
corporation. Westchester's argument is that PGM may not dispute that it is the alter ego
of Paria and Stephen Zimmerman because PGM is the alter ego. The circularity of this
argument makes res judicata inappropriate. The reasoning in Crest Tankers is sound and
should be persuasive.
Moreover, res judicata is inapplicable for an additional reason: The judgment
entered against PGM in the Paria proceeding is void because the Paria court did not have
jurisdiction over PGM. The doctrine of res judicata is intended to "preserve the integrity
of judgments." Appellee's Brief, p. 13. Because there is no integrity in an invalid or void

i

judgment, res judicata is inapplicable. PGM is not taking a "second bite at the apple."
PGM is contesting the entry of a $244,976.82 judgment entered against it when it had not
been named, had not been served, and had not appeared with full opportunity to contest
jurisdiction.
i

II.

ALLOWING PGM ITS DAY IN COURT TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK
THE DETERMINATION THAT IT IS THE ALTER EGO OF PARIA WILL
NOT RESULT IN A NEVER-ENDING SERIES OF LAWSUITS.
Westchester contends that PGM should be bound by the judgment entered in the

<

Paria proceeding, despite the fact that PGM was not named, was not served, and did not
appear in the Paria proceeding, because failure to bind PGM will result in a never-ending
series of lawsuits.
Such argument is meritless. Further litigation may be prevented simply by issuing
I
14

injunctions prohibiting transfers by all corporations from which Westchester seeks relief.
This remedy is available to Westchester pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-8(c)(ii).
Of course, such corporations must be named and served pursuant to the prescribed
procedures in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and long-recognized due process rights.
CONCLUSION
The judgment entered against PGM in the Paria proceeding, including the finding
relating to the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, is void and not binding upon PGM because
PGM was not named, was not served, and did not appear in the Paria proceeding. This is
the case despite the allegation that PGM is the alter ego of Paria and Stephen
Zimmerman. Because the judgment entered against PGM in the Paria proceeding is void
as to PGM, it is not res judicata to PGM. PGM respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's dismissal of PGM's complaint and remand this case for further
proceedings on the merits.

Dated this _6_ day of November, 1999.
Respectfully, submitted

BRENT D.Y<f)U$B

15

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this a day of November, 1999,1 caused to be mailed,
first-class mail, postage prepaid, the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, addressed as
follows:
Cameron S. Denning

DART ADAMSON DONOVAN & HANSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

r

duu* /? Uot^/
BRENT D. YOUNG /

16

ADDENDUM

A.

Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-8

B.

Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9

C.
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A.

Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-8

UT ST § 25-6-8, Remedies of creditors

Pagel

Utah Code § 25-6-8
UTAH CODE, 1953
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 25. FRAUD
CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this
document.)
Current through End of 1999 General Sess.

(c) subject to applicable principles of equity
and in accordance with applicable rules of civil
procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by
the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset
transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of
the asset transferred or of other property of the
transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may
require.

§ 25-6-8. Remedies of creditors
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or
obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject
to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to
the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's
claim;

(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a
claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the
court orders, may levy execution on the asset
transferred or its proceeds.
As enacted by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1988.

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 25. FRAUD

(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy
against the asset transferred or other property of
the transferee in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;

CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT
Search this disc for cases citing this section.

Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

B.

Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9

UT ST § 25-6-9, Good faith transfer
Utah Code § 25-6-9
UTAH CODE, 1953
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 25. FRAUD
CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this
document.)
Current through End of 1999 General Sess.
§ 25-6-9. Good faith transfer
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable
under Subsection 25-6-5 (l)(a) against a person
who took in good faith and for a reasonably
equivalent value or against any subsequent
transferee or obligee.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this
section, to the extent a transfer is voidable in an
action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8
(l)(a), the creditor may recover judgment for
the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted
under Subsection (3), or the amount necessary
to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less.
The judgment may be entered against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the
person for whose benefit the transfer was made;
or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a
good faith transferee who took for value or from
any subsequent transferee.
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is
based upon the value of the asset transferred, the
judgment must be for an amount equal to the
value of the asset at the time of the transfer,
subject to an adjustment as equities may require.
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or
an obligation under this chapter, a good-faith
transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of
Copyright (c) West Group 1999

Pagel
the value given the debtor for the transfer or
obligation, to:
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in
the asset transferred;
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on
the judgment.
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection
25-6-5 (l)(b) or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer
results from:
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the
debtor when the termination is pursuant to the
lease and applicable law; or
(b) enforcement of a security interest in
compliance with Title 70A, Chapter 9, the
Uniform Commercial Code.
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection
25-6-6 (2):
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to
or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer
was made unless the new value was secured by
a valid lien;
*7825 (b) if made in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and
the insider; or
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to
rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured
present value given for that purpose as well as
an antecedent debt of the debtor.
As enacted by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1988.

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 25. FRAUD
CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT

claim to original U.S. Govt, works

UT ST § 25-6-9, Good faith transfer
Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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[10] In the present case, the family court bution of the marital estate based on the
did not specify whether Husband had made a respective separate conditions of the spouses.
gift of his separate assets that were not
We therefore hold that Judge Luke's devicredited to him, thereby giving rise to an ation from the equal division of the Tougases'
appearance of a Gussin violation. However, joint property is justified in light of Wife's
as discussed above, the family court is ac- significant separate property holdings.
corded broad discretion in deciding what is
just and equitable under the circumstances.
III. CONCLUSION
Judge Luke, in response to the subsequent
motion for reconsideration, clearly articulatAccordingly, we affirm the family court's
ed the reasoning underlying the exclusion of division and distribution of the Tougases'
those particular assets in her order of distri- marital property.
bution. And because the family courts are
not bound by any "fixed rule for determining
the amount of property being awarded each
[ O 5 KEY NUMBER SYSTEM/
a ^r^V*"** ^S> M
spouse," the court may, subject to the parameters of HRS § 580-47, exercise its own independent judgment in arriving at a just and
equitable result. Gussin, 73 Haw. at 479,
836 P.2d at 489. Inasmuch as Judge Luke
has not abused the broad discretion afforded
James K. TANAKA, Fusako
by HRS § 580-47, we uphold her division of
Tanaka, Petitioners,
the Tougases' marital property.
and
3. Deviation From Equal Division
Ben T. Tanaka, Defendant,
of Joint Btisiness
v.
[11] Finally, Wife argues that because
the court determined that both she and Hus- Russell S. NAGATA, Judge, First Circuit
band contributed as equal partners to the
Court, State of Hawai'i, and All Lease,
formation and operation of PDI, she should
Inc., Respondent/Plaintiff.
be allotted fifty percent, and not twenty-five
No. 17615.
percent, of the business.
Supreme Court of Hawaii.
[12] The analysis of this contention is
very much the same as that utilized above.
Feb. 11, 1994.
Again, the court's actions in distributing the
estate are discretionary, based on what the
court deems to be just and equitable under
Property transferees petitioned for writ
the circumstances. Moreover, because the of mandamus directing the Circuit Court,
applicable statute, HRS § 580-47, allows the First Circuit, Russell Nagata, J., to vacate
court to consider the condition of the parties and set aside order in creditor's underlying
after the divorce, separate property holdings action against transferor debtor granting momay properly factor into the court's consider- tion for execution on fraudulently transferred
ation. This does not mean, however, that asset, on ground that transferees should have
Wife's partnership interests should offset been named as party defendants in underlyHusband's interest in the marital estate. ing action. The Supreme Court held that:
The validation of the spousal consent agree- (1) when a creditor alleges fraudulent transment, which operates as a waiver by Hus- fer of property from a judgment debtor to a
band of all rights to the partnerships, conclu- transferee who retains title to subject propsively establishes the contrary. The court erty or who claims interest in property or its
may, nevertheless, alter alimony, child sup- proceeds, transferee is necessary party to
port and, as in this case, the ultimate distri- any action seeking to set aside transfer, and
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(2) transferees were entitled to writ of mandamus.
Writ granted.

1. Mandamus <s>l
Mandamus is extraordinary remedy that
is not issued unless petitioner demonstrates
clear and indisputable right to relief and lack
of other means adequately to redress alleged
wrong or obtain requested action.
2. Mandamus <£=>4(1), 28
Writs of mandamus are neither meant to
supersede legal discretionary authority of
lower courts nor to serve as legal remedies in
lieu of normal appellate procedure.
3. Mandamus <3=*4(1), 26
Mandamus is appropriate remedy where
petitioner has indisputable right to defend
his or her interest in property, has not been
named as party in proceeding in lower court,
and has no remedy by way of appeal.
4. Fraudulent Conveyances <£=>255(4)
When creditor alleges fraudulent transfer of property from judgment debtor to
transferee who retains title to subject property or who claims interest in property or its
proceeds, transferee is necessary party to
any action seeking to set aside transfer.
HRS §§ 651C-4(a)(2), 651C-7.
5. Fraudulent
255(4)

Conveyances

<£»237(1),

7. Mandamus <§=>4(4), 53
Property transferees were entitled to
writ of mandamus directing circuit court to
vacate and set aside order in creditor's underlying action against transferor debtor
granting motion for execution on fraudulently transferred asset; creditor should have
filed separate action against transferees to
set aside alleged fraudulent transfer, and
transferees had no alternative remedy to
writ, as transferees had no right to appeal
order in underlying action. HRS §§ 651C4(a)(2), 651C-7.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is not issued unless the petitioner
demonstrates a clear and indisputable right
to relief and a lack of other means adequately to redress the alleged wrong or obtain the
requested action.
2. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy
where the petitioner: (1) has an indisputable
right to defend his or her interest in property; (2) has not been named as a party in the
proceeding in the lower court; and (3) has no
remedy by way of appeal.
3. Where a creditor alleges a fraudulent transfer of property from a judgment
debtor to a transferee who retains title to the
subject property or who claims an interest in
the property or its proceeds, the transferee
is a necessary party to any action seeking to
set aside the transfer.

WTien creditor seeks to set aside debtor's transfer of property as fraudulent, creditor's action for relief should be brought pursuant to Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
and should expressly name alleged fraudulent transferees as defendants.
HRS
§ 651C-1 et seq.

4. Fundamental principles of due process require that a transferee who claims an
interest in real property or its proceeds have
a full and fair opportunity to contest claims
of fraudulent transfer.

6. Constitutional Law <S=>278(1.1)

George K. Noguchi, Honolulu, on the writ
and reply, for petitioners.

Fraudulent Conveyances @=>306
Fundamental principles of due process
require that transferee who claims interest in
r
eal property or its proceeds have full and
feir opportunity to contest claims of fraudulent transfer. HRS§§ 651C-4(a)(2), 651C-7;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.

Jeffrey Daniel Lau, Keith Y. Yamada and
Carina Y. Miyazawa, Honolulu, on the answer, for respondent.
Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN,
LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ.
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PER CURIAM.
In this original proceeding, the petitioners
James K. Tanaka and Fusako Tanaka (the
petitioners) petition this court for an extraordinary writ directing the Honorable Judge
Russell Nagata, Judge of the District Court
of the First Circuit assigned to serve temporarily as a Judge of the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit,1 to vacate and set aside his
order granting a motion for execution on
fraudulently transferred asset, entered on
October 6,1993, in All Lease, Inc. v. Tanaka,
Civil No. 92-2858-08 (All Lease), and any
subsequent orders related to it. The petitioners contend that they should have been
named as party defendants in the All Lease
action because the subject property was
transferred to them and they have an interest in the property.

in common. On July 15,1991, the petitioners
and Ben entered into an agreement to sell
the property to Hakim Properties, Inc. (Hakim Properties) for $432,000.00. Ben quitclaimed his remaining one-half interest in the
property to the petitioners on September 18,
1991, purportedly to satisfy debts owed to
the petitioners. Because Hakim Properties
was unable to obtain financing, the contract
for the sale of the property was amended to
an agreement of sale, which was executed on
October 9, 1992. According to the agreement of sale, Hakim Properties agreed to
assume three existing mortgages on the
property for which Ben was liable and
agreed to pay the petitioners $3,736.67 per
month for thirty-six months, beginning on
November 5, 1992. '

On August 6, 1992, All Lease, Inc. (the
respondent)
filed the All Lease complaint in
Upon review of the record before us, we
the
circuit
court
against Ben for default of a
conclude that the petitioners have an interest
in the subject property and were indispens- vehicle lease agreement. The complaint
able parties in any action to set aside the sought back payments on the lease and reconveyance to them. Accordingly, we grant possession of the vehicles. On February 17,
the requested relief and vacate the order 1993, a judgment was entered against Ben in
granting motion for execution on fraudulent- the amount of $67,770.00.
ly transferred asset and any subsequent orOn May 24, 1993, the respondent moved to
ders related to it.
examine the petitioners about Ben's financial
affairs and was granted leave to question
I. BACKGROUND
them regarding the transfer of the property.
The petitioners are the parents of the de- Unable to collect the judgment from Ben, the
fendant Ben Tanaka (Ben). When Ben and respondent filed a motion for execution on
his wife, Mari Tanaka (Mari), divorced in fraudulently transferred asset on September
1991, the couple owned a condominium (the 3, 1993. In the motion, the respondent alproperty). Mari conveyed her half interest leged that the petitioners were not the actual
in the property to the petitioners on April 30, owners of the property because there was no
1991. As a consequence, the petitioners consideration for the transfer and the transowned a one-half interest and Ben owned a fer was made to the petitioners in contempla2
one-half interest in the property as tenants tion of avoiding Ben's debt. The petitioners
1. By order of the Chief Justice dated August 27,
1993. See Article VI, § 2 of the Hawai'i Constitution (1978).
2. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is codified under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) ch.
651C (1985). HRS § 651C-4(a)(2) provides in
relevant part:
§ 651C-4 Transfers fraudulent as to present
and future creditors, (a) A transfer made or
obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as
to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim
arose before or after the transfer was made
and the obligation was incurred, if the debtor
made the transfer or incurred the obligation:

(2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer of obligation, and the debtor:
(A) Was engaged or was about to engage in
a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small to the business or transaction; or
(B) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor
would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability
to pay as they became due.
HRS § 651C-7 provides in relevant part:
Remedies of creditors, (a) In any action for
relief against a transfer or obligation under
this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations provided in section 651C-8, may obtain:

X X U »» ltJ.,1
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«?ere not named as parties, but the respondent did serve them with notice of the hearse. Although Ben filed no opposition, his
attorney appeared at the hearing on Septemj,er 24, 1993 to request a continuance. The
circuit court denied the continuance and
granted the respondent's motion. On October 6, 1993, the circuit court entered the
order granting the respondent's motion for
execution of fraudulently transferred asset
that decreed as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Motion for Execution on Fraudulently
- Transferred Asset be and is hereby granted;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff
is allowed to execute on the receivables of
James K. Tanaka and Fusako Tanaka arising out of their Agreement of Sale to Hakim Properties, Inc. dated October 9, 1992
relating to the sale of Apt. 601, Punahou
Palms condominium and to credit any monies received thereunder to the outstanding Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and
against Defendant Ben T. Tanaka.
The circuit court subsequently issued a garnishee summons and order and directed
Hakim Properties to hold all debts owed to
the petitioners and to make the monthly
payments to the respondent. Although the
petitioners were not parties to the action,
they nevertheless filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied, and the
petitioners filed the instant petition.
II. STANDARD FOR DISPOSITION
[1--3] This court has consistently held
that a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary

remedy that is usually not issued unless the
petitioner demonstrates: (1) a clear and indisputable right to relief; and (2) a lack of
other means adequately to redress the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action.
Breiner v. Takao, 73 Haw. 499, 502, 835 P.2d
637, 640 (1992) (citations omitted). Such
writs are neither meant to supersede the
legal discretionary authority of the lower
courts nor to serve as legal remedies in lieu
of normal appellate procedure. State ex rel
Marsland v. Town, 66 Haw. 516, 668 P.2d 25
(1983). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy
where the petitioners, as in the instant proceeding, have an indisputable right to defend
their interest in property, have not been
named as parties to the lower court action,
and have no remedy by way of appeal. See
Stewart Properties, Inc. v. Brennan, 8 Haw.
App. 431, 807 P.2d 606 (1991) (only parties to
a lawsuit may appeal from any adverse judgment).3
III. DISCUSSION
The petitioners argue that: (1) they were
denied due process when their property was
taken without notice and an opportunity to
be heard; (2) the circuit court had no authority to issue the disputed order because the
petitioners were not named as parties to the
All Lease action; and (3) there is no alternative to a writ because the petitioners were
not parties to the proceedings below and
have no remedy by way of appeal. The
respondent acknowledges that the petitioners
were not parties to the action, but contends
that it was unnecessary to name the petitioners as parties because: (1) the evidence established conclusively that the property was
fraudulently transferred;4 and (2) any propurposes of appeal and that a denial of such a
motion to intervene would be appealable. Stewart Properties, 8 Haw.App. at 433 n. 1., 807 P.2d
at 607 n. 1. (citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301,
303, 108 S.Ct. 586, 587, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (1988)).
In the present case, the petitioners, who were not
represented by counsel until after the respondent's motion was granted, did not move to intervene. We decline, under these circumstances, to
require them to have intervened.

(1) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to
the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's
claim;
(b) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on
a claim against the debtor, the creditor may, if
the court so orders, levy execution on the asset
transferred or its proceeds.
HRS § 651C-8 delineates the defenses, liability,
and protection accorded to transferees. The petitioners are transferees in the instant case.
*• In Stewart Properties, the ICA suggested that a
n
on-paity whose interest is affected by a trial
court's judgment should seek intervention for the

4.

Although the circuit court did not specifically
find that the conveyance from Ben to the petitioners was fraudulent, that finding is implicit in

-—.**,
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ceeds from the sale of the property belonged
to Ben and not to the petitioners. The respondent also contends that the petitioners
have a remedy against Ben and that relief by
way of mandamus is therefore not warranted.

render complete relief in action to set aside
fraudulent conveyance); Murray v. Mtirrau"
358 So.2d 723, 725 (Miss.1978) (grantee *
necessary party in action to set aside fraudu-*
lent conveyance); Dempsey & Spring, P.C.fi
Ramsay, 79 A.D.2d 1017, 1018, 435 N.Y.S.2d
A. The Respondent Should Have Filed A 336, 337 (1981) (trial court acted improperly
Separate Action Against The Petitioners in determining that defendant's conveyance
In Their Attempt To Set Aside The Al- of property to his daughter was fraudulent
where no notice or opportunity to appeal was
leged Fraudulent Transfer
afforded to daughter, who was present owner
Although there is no recent Hawaii au- of record); Fraley Ins. Agency v. Johnston, *
thority expressly denominating the necessary 784 P.2d 430 (Okl.App.1989) (in action to set
parties to an action to set aside an alleged aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer of
fraudulent transfer, our territorial court not- property, grantee or transferee claiming ined that, in this jurisdiction, a transfer to terest in subject property was necessary and
defraud a creditor is void as to the creditor indispensable to resolution of claim); Becker
and the question whether the transfer was v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 380, 416 A.2d 156,162 *
bona fide may be adjudicated in an action at (1980) (transfer of property creates interest .
law; in order to do so, however, it is clearly in grantee that made grantee necessary parnecessary to have the alleged fraudulent ty to action for fraudulent conveyance, even
transferee before the court in order to bind though no fraud on grantee's part needed to
him. Hoffschlaeger Co. v. Jones, 24 Haw. 74 be shown); see also Kennedy, Reception of
(1917) (citations omitted). Although the the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 43
statement regarding a transferee in Hoffs- S.C.L.Rev. 655, 673 (1992) (to avoid constituchlaeger is dictum, it is consistent with deci- tional due process objections, any transferee
sions from courts in other jurisdictions that or other claimant to property transferred or
have ruled that a grantee or transferee of its proceeds should be party to any creditor's
property, who claims an interest therein, is a action that would affect claimant's rights in
necessary and indispensable party to the res- property).
olution of a claim of fraudulent transfer.
See, e.g., Simmons v. Clark Equipment Cred- [4-6] We agree with the authority cited
it Corp., 554 So.2d 398, 399 (Ala.1989) (grant- above, reaffirm the dictum in Hoffschlaeger,
ee who retained title to property was neces- and hold that where a creditor alleges a
sary party to action by grantor's creditors to fraudulent transfer of property from a judgset aside conveyance as fraudulent); T W M ment debtor to a transferee who retains title
Homes, Inc. v. Atherwood Realty & Invest- to the subject property or who claims an
ment Co., 214 Cal.App.2d 826, 847, 29 Cal. interest in the property or its proceeds, the
Rptr. 887, 899 (1963) (transferees were nec- transferee is a necessary party to any action
essary party defendants in action to set aside seeking to set aside the transfer.5 Such an
fraudulent conveyance); Guice v. Modica, action for relief against a transfer alleged to
337 So.2d 302, 303 (La.App.1976) (children to be fraudulent should be brought pursuant to
whom debtor made donation of property Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 651C
were indispensable parties to suit by creditor (1985), see supra n. 2, and should expressly
to nullify donation); Mihajlovski v. Elfakir, name the alleged fraudulent transferees as
135 Mich.App. 528, 535, 355 N.W.2d 264, 267 defendants. Our holding is consistent with
(1984) (presence of grantee who retains title established Hawai'i law regarding the namto property was essential to permit court to ing of parties in property disputes. Cf Rosthe court's order that allowed the respondent to
execute on the proceeds that the petitioners had
received.
5. Although the petitioners sold the property by
way of agreement of sale to Hakim Properties,

they remain the titleholders of the property until
the payments under the agreement of sale are
completed in 1995. The petitioners also have a
claim to the monthly proceeds from the sale of
the property.
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siter v. Rossiter, 4 HawApp. 333, 337, 666
P.2d 617, 620 (1983) (record owner of property was necessary and indispensable party to
action affecting her interest in property, and
family court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
questions affecting title to property where
record owner not named as party). Fundamental principles of due process require that
transferees who claim an interest in real
property or its proceeds have a full and fair
opportunity to contest claims of fraudulent
transfer. Because the respondent resorted
to an improper vehicle for establishing a
fraudulent transfer, the order granting the
respondent's motion to execute on fraudulently transferred asset must be vacated.6
B. The Petitioners Have No Alternative
Remedy To A Writ
[7] Contrary to the respondent's contention, the petitioners have no alternative remedy to a writ. As the circuit court ruling
now stands, the petitioners have no right to
appeal because they were not parties to the
All Lease action. See Stewart Properties,
Inc., 8 HawApp. at 433, 807 P.2d at 607 (only
parties to a lawsuit may appeal from an
adverse judgment). The circuit court allowed the petitioners to file a motion for
reconsideration, but this action alone did not
make them parties to the proceedings. Furthermore, it is questionable whether a nonparty could even file such a motion in a
pending action. However, as we have noted,
after the disputed order is vacated, the respondent can file an action under HRS ch.
651C naming the petitioners as defendants.
It is possible that the circuit court may conclude that the respondent is entitled to garnish the payments that Hakim Properties
makes to the petitioners. Should it do so,
the petitioners, as named defendants, would
then have a remedy by way of appeal.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we direct Judge
Nagata, the administrative judge of the First
Circuit Court, or the latter's designee, to
vacate the October 6,1993 order granting the
6- By issuing this opinion, this court renders no
decision on the respondent's allegation that Ben
transferred the subject property to the petitioners

respondent's motion for execution on fraudulently transferred asset and any subsequent
orders related to it.
rwi
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KO'OLAU AGRICULTURAL CO., LTD.,
a Hawai'i corporation, Appellant,
v.
COMMISSION ON WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, William W. Paty in
his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Water Resource Management, John C. Lewin, M.D., Michael J.
Chun, Ph.D., Robert S. Nakata, Richard
H. Cox and Guy K. Fujimura, in their
capacity as members of the Commission
on Water Resource Management, Appellees.
No. 16473.
Supreme Court of Hawaii.
Feb. 25, 1994.
Agricultural firm appealed decision of
commission on water resource management
to designate certain aquifer systems as
ground water management areas. The Supreme Court held that notice of appeal was
not timely filed.
Appeal dismissed.
1. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=>723
Waters and Water Courses <s=>100
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to
hear agricultural firm's appeal of decision of
commission on water resource management
to designate certain aquifer systems as
ground water management areas where notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days
to avoid payment of the respondent's judgment
against Ben.

D. Murdock v. Blake. 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971)

These actions seem to be maintained upon the theory that directors are trustees
for creditors, but generally these cases
have some element of fraud and deceit
involved therein. * * *
See also cases cited in the annotation at
SO A.L.R. .462.
We think the trial court correctly held
that the second amended complaint did not
state a cause of action against the individual defendants, the judgment is affirmed
with costs to the respondents.
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT,
HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
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26 Utah 2d 22
Peter B. MURDOCK and Anthony J. Butkovich, dba P & B Oil Company,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Richard L. BLAKE, dba Wendover Richfield ;
and Atlantic Richfield Company, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 12195.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 8, 1971.

not have been made upon designated proc-1H
ess agent nor show that station operator ^M
came within statutory class of persons au- fl
thorized to receive service of process for 9
lessor, default judgment against lessor was a
void.
9
Affirmed, except for award of attor- I I
neys' fees.
II
1. Process <£=>4

Service of summons in conformance
with mode prescribed by statute is jurisdictional, for it is the service of process, not
actual knowledge of commencement of action, which confers jurisdiction.

Jl
M
M
M
1

2. Process <§=>4
3
Proper issuance and service of sum- *j
mons is means of invoking jurisdiction of ^
court and of acquiring jurisdiction over
defendant and such cannot be supplanted
by mere notice by letter, telephone or any
other such means.
3. Corporations <§=*668(4)
Judgment <&=>I4I

Where service was not made on foreign corporation's designated process agent
as provided by law, even if corporation
had actual knowledge of the action, court
did not have jurisdiction over corporation
which was entitled to have default judgment entered against it vacated. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rules 4(e) (4), 41(b).
4. Process <£=>74, 135

Lessor, which had obtained quashal of
service of summons on it in action based
on "insufficient funds" checks given by operator of leased gasoline service station
and declaration that judgment against it
was void moved for judgment on counterclaim for value of property sold on execution. The Third District Court, Tooele
County, Gordon R. Hall, J., granted motion
and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme
Court, Callister, C. J., held that where return of officer making service upon station
operator as agent of lessor, a foreign corporation, which had qualified to do business in Utah and had a designated process
agent, did not indicate that service could

Ji

Under rule providing system of classification whereby service is to be upon one
group primarily with right to serve others
as secondary mode, to justify service upon
member of inferior class, it must be shown
that service upon member of superior
class cannot be had and.if person served
was member of secondary class, return
must sufficiently show facts which warrant
service upon him. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 4(e) (4).
5. Judgment <§=>I7(9)

Where return of officer making service upon alleged agent of foreign corporation, which had qualified to do business in
Utah and had a designated process agent,
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did not indicate that service could not have
been made upon designated process agent
nor show that person served came within
statutory class of persons authorized to receive service of process, default judgment
against foreign corporation was void for
lack of proper service, even though plaintiffs' counsel may have received misinformation from office of Secretary of State
to effect that corporation was not qualified
to do business in the state. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 4(e) (4).

m
K

w

6. Judgment <§=>40l

:V

After judgment for plaintiff is vacated, plaintiff stands in position of trustee of
defendant of the property obtained under
the judgment and restitution may be
sought in the same or an independent action.
7. Secured Transactions <§=>I6I
In all security interests, debtor's interest in collateral remains subject to claims
of creditors who take appropriate action.
U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311,
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
8(d).

m

«

8. Secured Transactions <§=*I38, 168
Security agreement creates in favor of
secured party a lien entitled to priority
over rights of unsecured creditors, but collateral may still be sold by execution creditor subject to interest of the secured party.
U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311,
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
8(d).

B5£

§€

9. Secured Transactions <§=>228
Most important remedy available to secured party is right to take possession of
collateral following a debtor's default. U.
CA.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311,
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
8(d).
JO. Secured Transactions C=>222, 237
After default, debtor has lost his right
of possession in property subject to security interest and retains only contingent
n
ght in the surplus, if any, after sale. U.
CA.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311,

70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
8(d).
11. Secured Transactions <&=>228
On default, secured party is entitled to
possession as against a subsequent levying
creditor, for levy cannot void secured party's right to repossession. U.C.A.1953,
70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 70A-9-503;
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8(d).
12. Pleading C=>I82

Allegations in counterclaim not responded to are deemed admitted. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rule, 8(d).
13. Secured Transactions O I 7 0 , 228
Where, at time suppliers of gasoline
service station obtained default judgment
against operator of station on basis of operator's giving supplier's checks returned
marked "insufficient funds", operator had
been in default to lessor oil company which
had security interest in tools, equipment,
inventory and proceeds therefrom, oil company was entitled to possession of collateral and to recover from suppliers its value
at time of sheriff's sale rather than proceeds of the sale. U.C.A. 1953, 70A-9-306,
70A-9-503.
14. Secured Transactions <§=>I7I
One who has possession or immediate
right to possession, such as chattel mortgagee or conditional seller after default, may
maintain action for conversion against one
who has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion over property.
15. Trover and Conversion <§=>46

Ordinarily, where there has been a
conversion, and property is not returned,
measure of damages is value of property at
time of the conversion.

Parker M. Nielson, LaMar Duncan, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Allen H. Tibbals, of Boyden, Tibbals &
Staten, Salt Lake City, for defendants and
respondents.
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CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs commenced the initial phase of
this case in March of 1969, when they filed
an action against Richard Blake and Atlantic Richfield Company, alleging that
Blake was the agent and operator of a
service station in Wendover, Utah, which
was owned and leased By Atlantic. Plaintiffs then alleged that on three separate occasions, Blake, in the course of his employment, purchased merchandise for which he
gave checks to plaintiffs, which were returned to plaintiffs and marked "Insufficient Funds." Plaintiffs prayed for judgment against the defendants for $2,551.98
in their first cause of action, and for $2,652.89 in the second and third causes of
action.

Secretary of State. Plaintiffs' attorney
was admonished that legal action would be
taken if the seizure and sale of the assets
of the service station were consummated.
Nevertheless, the sale was held, at which
time three parties paid cash in the sum of
$1,290.03; and plaintiff, Butkovich, purchased the remainder for $1,531.60, which
was applied against the judgment.

Subsequently, Atlantic filed a motion to
vacate the judgment and to quash the service of summons. Atlantic alleged that
service of summons upon it, a foreign corporation, had not been in accordance with
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P. Atlantic pleaded that
it was a Pennsylvania corporation, qualified
to do business in Utah, and that at all
times pertinent to this action it had on file
with the Secretary of State a designated
Service of summons was made upon resident agent qualified to receive service
Blake by serving him personally, and serv- of process, namely, the C. T. Corporation
ice upon Atlantic was made by delivering System at 175 South Main Street, Salt
the summons and complaint to "Richard L. Lake City, Utah. The pleading stated that
Blake, agent." On April 28, 1969, plain- no process at any time was served upon
tiffs had a default judgment entered this designated agent. Atlantic concluded
against both defendants. Plaintiffs subse- that the service was defective and no jurisquently brought a supplemental proceeding diction was acquired; and, therefore, the
against Blake, and in May 1969, they en- judgment should be set aside and the partered into a stipulation with Blake which ties restored to their prior status. Plainprovided a schedule of payments. Evident- tiffs' response thereto asserted that Atlanly, Blake did not make the payments, and, tic was aware of the action, and that plainthereafter, plaintiffs caused an undated ex- tiffs' counsel had inquired at the office of
ecution to be issued on the judgment. A the Secretary of State and been informed
sheriffs sale upon the personal property that Atlantic was not qualified to do busilocated in the service station was set for ness in the state of Utah, and, therefore, at
the 24th of September, 1969. Atlantic the time of service of process, Blake was
learned of this proposed sale and through the only agent having control of the assets
its credit manager notified plaintiffs' attor- of the corporation within the state.
ney that Atlantic claimed a security interA hearing was held, and the trial court
est in the property. Included with the letentered an order quashing the service of
ter were copies of all the documents which
summons on the ground Blake was not an
indicated that Atlantic had a perfected seagent of Atlantic within the meaning of
curity interest in all the tools and service
Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P.; and therefore,
station equipment and inventory, and proservice upon him was insufficient to bring
ceeds therefrom. The security agreement
Atlantic within the jurisdiction of the
had been executed November 14, 1968, to
secure payment of a promissory note exe- court. The judgment against Atlantic was
cuted by Blake on September 16, 1968, for declared void and vacated.
the sum of $8,781.19. A financing stateThereafter, defendant Atlantic filed a
ment was filed in accordance with the Uni- motion for restitution, wherein Atlantic alform Commercial Code in the office of the leged that its property, having a market
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value of $4,942.88, was sold at the sheriff's
sale. Accompanying the motion was an affidavit of Atlantic's regional credit manager, itemizing the property and its value.
Plaintiffs have never controverted this affidavit. Subsequently, plaintiffs properly
served Atlantic and then responded to the
motion for restitution by claiming that the
issues raised in the complaint would determine the true ownership of the property
claimed by Atlantic. The trial court entered an order requiring plaintiffs to pay
into court the sum of $4,942.88, the value
of the property sold, to be held by the
clerk, subject to the order of the court as
to the ultimate disposition thereof, based
upon a determination of the right thereto
as between plaintiffs and Atlantic. Defendant Atlantic filed an answer, counterclaim, and a cross-claim against Blake.
Plaintiffs filed a reply to the counterclaim,
and an appeal to this court, which was dismissed as premature; the case was remanded to the trial court.
Plaintiffs took no further action to comply with the order of the court; so Atlantic filed a motion to dismiss under Rule
41(b), U.R.C.P., and for judgment on its
counterclaim for the value of the property
sold on execution under the void judgment.
The trial court granted judgment in accordance with the motion; plaintiffs appeal therefrom.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court
erred in vacating the default judgment entered against defendant Atlantic, because
Atlantic had actual knowledge of the action. Plaintiffs argue that although service was not made on Atlantic's designated
process agent, as provided by law, Atlantic
was aware of the impending sheriff's sale
and contacted plaintiffs' attorney prior to
the date upon which it was held.
Atlantic urges that strict compliance
with Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., is necessary
*° acquire jurisdiction over the corporation
'• Sternbeck v. Buck, 148 Cal.App.2d 829,
307 P.2d 970, 972 (1957) ; Tropic Builder
s, Ltd. v. Naval Ammunition Depot,
48 Haw. 306, 402 P.2d 440, 448 (1965).

and that service upon Blake was not in
conformity therewith, and was, therefore,
insufficient;
the trial court properly
quashed the service of summons and declared the judgment against Atlantic void.
[1-3] Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of
process, not actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, which confers jurisdiction. Otherwise, a defendant could
never object to the sufficiency of service
of process, since he must have knowledge
of the suit to make such objection.1 The
proper issuance and service of summons is
the means of invoking the jurisdiction of
the court and of acquiring jurisdiction
over the defendant; these cannot be supplanted by mere notice by letter, telephone
or any other such means. 2
Plaintiffs further assert that service
upon Blake wras sufficient under Rule 4(e)
(4), U.R.C.P., to acquire jurisdiction over
Atlantic because Blake was an agent who
had the management and control over
property to which Atlantic claims a right
of possession.
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P., provides:
Personal service within the state shall
be as follows:
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein
otherwise provided for, * * * by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a
managing or general agent, or to any
other agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process
and, if the agent is one authorized by
statute to receive service and the statute
so requires, by also mailing a copy to the
defendant. If no such officer or agent
can be found in the county in which the
action is brought, then upon any such officer or agent, or any clerk, cashier,
managing agent, chief clerk, or other
2. Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 409, 410, 402
P.2d 703 (1965).
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agent having the management, direction
or control of any property of such corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the state. If no
such officer or agent can be found in
the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an
officer or place of business in this state,
or does business in this state, then upon
the person doing such business or in
charge of such office or place of business.
The evidence established that Atlantic
had been qualified to do business in the
state of Utah, that it was in good standing,
and that it had a designated process agent.
[4] Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., provides a
system of classification whereby service is
to be upon one group primarily with a
right to serve others as a secondary mode.
In order to justify service upon a member
of an inferior class under Rule 4(e) (4),
U.R.C.P., it must be shown that service
upon a member of the superior classes cannot be had. If the person served was a
member of the secondary class, the return
must sufficiently show the facts which
warrant service on him.3
[5] In the instant action, Atlantic's designated agent, C. T. Corporation, was a
member of the primary class, and Blake,
even under plaintiffs' theory, was a member of an inferior class. Furthermore, the
return of the officer making the service
neither indicated that service could not be
made upon some member in the superior
class, nor did it show by proper description
that the person served came within an inferior class. The affidavit of plaintiffs'
counsel during the proceeding to quash the
service does not cure the defect; the fact
that counsel may have received misinformation from the office of the Secretary of
State does not dispense with compliance
3. Reader v. District Court, 98 Utah 1, 94
P.2d 858 (1939) ; Boston Acme Mines
Development Co. v. Clawson, 66 Utah
103, 123, 124, 127, 240 P. 165 (1925) ;
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Standard Accident
Insurance Co., 191 F.Supp. 174, 176
(USDCDUtah, 1960).

with Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., which is formulated in mandatory terms. The judgment against Atlantic was void for lack of
proper service.
Plaintiffs further contend that the trial
court improperly granted an order for restitution, and, furthermore, plaintiffs should
be compelled to restore only $2,821.63, the
sum for which the property was sold at the
sheriffs sale. Plaintiffs also challenge the
court's award of attorneys' fees.
[6] In Levy v. Drew, 4 the court held
that where a judgment has been vacated by
a trial court, the defendant is entitled to
restitution of all things taken from him under the judgment. After the judgment is
vacated, the plaintiff stands in the position
of a trustee of defendant of the property
obtained under the judgment. Restitution
may be sought in the same or an independent action. 5
Atlantic was a secured party and Blake
was a debtor under a security agreement,
and the issues of the instant action must be
determined in accordance with the Commercial Code, Title 70A, U.C.A.1953, as
amended 1965.
70A-9-311, U.C.A.1953,
1965, provides:

as

amended

The debtor's rights in collateral may
be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security
agreement prohibiting any transfer or
making the transfer constitute a default.
[7,8] The official comments to the
code indicate that the purpose of Section
9-311 is to provide without equivocation
that in all security interests the debtor's interest in the collateral remains subject to
claims of creditors who take appropriate
4. 4 Cal.2d 456, 50 P.2d 435, 101 A.L.R.
1144 (1935).
5. Also see Todaro v. Gardner, 3 Utah 2d
404, 409, 285 P.2d 839 (1955); 46 Am.
Jur.2d, Judgments, § 7S8, p. 949.
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action.6 The security agreement creates in
favor of the secured party a lien on the
chattels involved which is entitled to priority over the rights of unsecured creditors,
but it does not exempt the collateral from
forced judicial sale. The collateral may
still be sold by an execution creditor subject to the interest of the secured party. 7
Section 70A-9-311 must be construed in
light of Section 70A-9-503,8 which provides :
Unless otherwise agreed a secured
party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking
possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be
done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action * * *.
[9-11] The most important remedy
available to a secured party is the right to
take possession of the collateral following
a debtor's default.9 After default the debtor has lost his right of possession and sale
and retains only a contingent right in the
surplus, if any, after sale. On default, a
secured party is entitled to possession as
against a subsequent levying creditor, for a
levy cannot void the secured party's right
to repossession.10
[12] In the instant action, Atlantic alleged in its pleadings that the debtor,
Blake, had been in default in payment of
his promissory note; that no payment of
any kind had been made on the obligation
since April of 1969, and that by reason of
Ws default, Atlantic was entitled to possession of the collateral described in the seFirst National Bank of Glendale v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County, 34 Wis.2d 535,
149 N.W.2d 548 (1967).

I Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc.,
. (Fla.App.l967) 204 So.2d 740.
*• Harrison Music Co. v. Drake, 43 Pa.
Dist. & Co.2d 637 (1967).
' tf*- <->

*• Karp Bros., Inc. v. West Ward Savings
« Loan Assn. of Shamokin, Penn., (Penn.
Sup.Ct.1970) 271 A.2d 493.
ltt

VPlatte

Valley Bank of North Bend v

-

Kracl, 185 Neb. 168, 174 N.W.2d 724
(1970) ; William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess
«84 P.2d—HV2

curity agreement. These allegations were
incorporated in Atlantic's counterclaim
against plaintiffs, and, since plaintiffs did
not respond thereto, they are deemed admitted under Rule 8(d), U.R.C.P.
[13] Since Blake was in default at the
time plaintiffs received the default judgment, Atlantic was entitled to possession of
the collateral at that time, both by virtue
of the express provisions of the security
agreement and by 70A-9-503. In other
words, the right to possession and sale of
the collateral passed from the debtor,
Blake, to the secured party, Atlantic, at the
time of default, and these are the rights to
which Atlantic was entitled to be restored.
[14] One who has possession or an immediate right to possession, such as a chattel mortgagee or conditional seller after
default, may maintain an action for conversion against one who has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion,over the property of another in exclusion or denial of
his rights or inconsistent therewith. 11 The
Restatement of the Law, Restitution, § 128,
p. 156, provides:
A person who has tortiously obtained,
retained, used, or disposed of the chattels
of another, is under a duty of restitution
to the other.12
[15] Ordinarily, where there has been
a conversion, and the property is not returned, the measure of damages is the value of the property at the time of the
conversion.13 The affidavit, submitted by
Atlantic as to the value of the property at
the time of the sheriff's sale has not been
& Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc.2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.
2d 659 (1967).
11. First National Bank of Bay Shore v.
Stamper, 93 N.J.Super. 150, 225 A.2d
162 (1966).
12. Also see § 131, Illustration 3, p. 544.
13. Whittler v. Sharp, 43 Utah 419, 426,
135 P. 112 (1913) ; Clarke Floor Machine Div. of Studebaker Corp. v. Gordon
(Maryland 1970), 7 U.C.C.Reptr.Serv.
363; Doenges-Glass, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., (Colo.1970) 472
P.2d 761.

controverted by plaintiffs; so Atlantic is entitled to that amount rather than the proceeds of the sale as urged by plaintiffs.14
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, except for the award of attorneys'
fees, which was predicated on a provision
in the security agreement to which plaintiffs were not parties. Costs are awarded
to defendant, Atlantic Richfield Company.
TUCKETT, HENRIOD, ELLETT, and
CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
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Plaintiff brought suit to recover as assignee of note and security agreement by
which defendants had purchased farm machinery from assignor. The 7th District
Court, Emery County, Henry Ruggeri, J.,
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and
defendants appealed. The Supreme Court,
Crockett, J., held that evidence that there
was no claim in writing that some of purchased farm equipment had failed to work
until 23 months after transaction, a few
days before first major installment payment was due, supported finding that assignee of note and security agreement was
holder in due course and entitled to recover against defendants.
Affirmed except as to award of attorney's fees.
14. It should be emphasized that Atlantic
was entitled to possession based on
Blake's default; if Blake had not been

1. Bills and Notes <§=**97(l), 525

£

Where execution of note and security
agreement by which defendants had purchased farm machinery and assignment of
them to plaintiff was admitted, it was prima facie established that plaintiff was
holder in due course and entitled to recover and defendants had burden of proving that plaintiff was not holder in due
course and other affirmative defenses. U.
C.A.1953, 70A-3-307.
2. Sales @=>288(l)

Absent persuasive reason for avoiding
waiver of defense clause, warnings in documents by which defendants had purchased
farm machinery that defendants agreed
that defenses or breaches of warranty
could not be asserted against third persons
would be given effect. U.C.A.19S3, 70 A9-206.
3. Bills and Notes <®=>525

Evidence that there was no claim in
writing that some of purchased farm
equipment had failed to work until 23
months after transaction, a few days before first major installment payment was
due, supported finding that assignee of
note and security agreement was holder in
due course and entitled to recover against
defendants. U.C.A.1953, 70A-3-307.
4. Secured Transactions €=226

In suit to recover as assignee of note
and security agreement, where there was
no evidence in record upon which to base
award of attorney's fees, plaintiff was not
entitled to such award.

Stanley V. Litizzette, Helper, E. J.
Skeen, R. C. Skeen, of Skeen & Skeen,
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
S. J. Sweetring, Price, for plaintiff and
respondent.
in default, Atlantic would merely be
entitled to assert its priority and right
to the proceeds. § 70A-9-306.

